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IN 11-'.E SUPREME COURT OF THC: STATE OF UT/·.H
CRAIG tli::CHAM and
JOHN llt:DMAN,

Plaintiffs

Appellants,

)
)
)
)

)
VS •.

MYIWN L. BENSON and

ELLEN BEHSON,

Defendants - Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.
15649

BRH.F OF PLAINTIFFS - APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellants brought an action against Respondents to recover
moneys paid as guarantors of respondents note with bank
recover costs of repossession of a mobile home.

a~d

to

Respondents counter-

claimed for damages alleging fraud.
DISPOSITIOH" IN LOWER COURT

The- case was tried to a jury upon a general verdict.

The jury

found for defendants - respondents and against plaintiffs - appellants
and awarded respondents damages.
RELit:F SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellants seek to have the jury verdict dismissed as tu themSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

selves or in the alternative for a new trial on issues in error.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants were owners of a corpuration, Majestic Homes, Inc.
{T-.J)
whose business was the sale of mobile homes ·Ii Respondents approa•:;
appellants and inquired about the purchase of certain homes.

ApptJ

ants showed respondents a certain mobile home that had been used

{_,-...,,)
for some time as a demonstrator modelAand were told thex could

(r.1~.1.3)

purchase the home at a discount because of its prior use./.. Respcn·
(J.1;(,1,,'11)

(T-113,fC'?-7.17)

'

dents inspected the home ,}i noted certain defects11 and agreed to purchase the home for a price below the normal price for that type

(-r. 1l)
mobile home .A
Respondents moved into the home and lived there for about 9
months when they ceased to make payments on their loan and then
( 1-10:.)
moved from the home without notice to appellants.A Appellants
attempted to contact the respondents to obtain payments, but

rwJ

no response to their inquiries.

bus~:,

Appellants had ceased doing

as Majestic Homes, Inc., but rP-mained secondarily liable on Respondents' note to the bank, and maintained by virtue thereof a
security interest in the home.

I

Accordingly, appellants made res·

pendents payments to the bank ansf. then after notice tc responder.:'
(T-~'1')

resold the abandoned mobile home.A
Appellants then commenced legal proceedings to recover the

I

payments made on their behalf and to recover costs of repassessi::j
I

Appellants alsc sought to recover the deficiency between the ~~
price and the loan balance which was also paid to the bank by
appellants.
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ARGUMENT
I

APPELLANTS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR THE
CU.IM BROIJGFT AGAINST T!!EM AS AGENTS

OF MAJESTIC H011ES, INC.
At the trial no evidence: was introduced to show that the
appellants were the alter ego of the corporation from whom they
purchased the mobile home.

There was no introduction of evidence

to show identity cf interests or disregard of the corporate entity
by the appellants. {_--r,:'/-'f-'11)

Appellants sued respondent::; as individuals for moneys expended,
but did not thereby consent to personal liability for their prior
acts as agents of the corporation.
~·

/1

'fi7

Absent a finding that there had been a disregard of the corporat,

entity the appellants as officers and directors could only be liable
in contract if they had signed the contracts personally.

llowever,

all documents were signed by appellants on behalf of the corporation.

(TR.

'f'f-'11)

Although the respondents' pleadings alleged fraud by the

appellants the~e was no proof of fraud nor finding of frau<l by the
(:rn I JS, In;
Court.~This court has found in Tintic Indian Chief Mining and
Milling Co v. Clyde, 79 Utah 337, 10 P. 2d 932 (

that it is

necessary to allege and prove actual fraud showing that the director~
or stockholders did not act in geed faith.
These normal protections to officers and directors Df corporations are 2xtended and corporate existence is continued for this
purpose beyond the time of dissolution of the corporation.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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\

The corporate entity is continued by Utah Code Annotated Sectior

16-10-100 and 16-10-101 ( 1953) as amended.

These sections expr'

ly provide that an action properly brought against the corporati
may be defended in the corporate name after the corporations dis·
solution.
The record shows that there was no fraud by the appellants,
( -r~. I).. S:- I ;J.. 7)
alleged.f1 The respondents testified at trial and in their affida.1
that they knew the mobile home had been usedy and were told it
(T/f. &f7, lbt.- Jc¥)

was used by the appellant Craig Mecham. /I Respondents also inspec:1
(-rR11?>)

the home and were aware of certain needed repairs ;/)they bought t·
home with knowledge that it was sold for a lower price because:
(/Tf. '""';)

its prior use./) Respondents failed to show that the appellants c.
either of them knowingly and with intent to mislead the respondei
failed to reveal ali material facts known to them to the respond!
(f"R. . .Z ~-3,, </-01 S't/, ?'ii")
Although respondents witness testified that a mobile home
was blown over prior to sale there was no proof that it was in:
the respondents mobile home nor that the appellant had any know:
( '17f. . 'f I - p-)
that it had blown over. ;1 The witness testifying that one had blc
~.f'f)

over also testified that it was not damaged to any degree .A The:
fore, even if it had been shown that the respondents trailer hac
blown over it would not follow that appellant would have known··
that the fact would have been material to the respondents had t'.'
known.
The law has always required proof of fraud by clear and cc:
ing evidence that there was a material mis-representation

and~

·
t h e respond ents relied on the mis-representation
to their detr:·t
Obeg v. Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P 2d 229 (1947), 234; ~
v. Lauritzen,
424Law P2d
136,
18 Utah
2dInstitute
386
(1967).
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The evidence shows that the appellant Craig Mecham acted in
total good faith revealing all the defects of which he was aware
and offering complete opportunity to inspect and reject the trailer
if unsatisfied.

Respondents have not proved that they were damaged.

At most they have shown mutual mistake which is insufficient to invoke personal liability.

Respondents had the burden.of proving that

there was a material mis-representation upon which they relied and
which caused pecuniary damage and that respondents wculd have
acted differently had the mis-representation not been made.

Res-

show

pendents failed in their proof to
convincing evidence.

~

these elements by clear and

There was no proof of loss of benefit of the

bargain or of the difference between the actual value and value represented.

Accordingly respondents failed to meet their burden of
507~

proof. Obeg v. Sanders, 111 Utah

184 P2d 229 (1947), 234;

Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P2d 273, (1952).
It was also error to permit the jury to consider the issue of)
{e1s "Tc3v<.sTeJ ~.131

liability for fraud without requiring specific

interrogatories~as

to whether the jury in fact found intentional mis-representations
and that such mis-representations were material and were relied
on by the respondents for their damage.

Failure to provide specific

interrogatories resulted in the usurpation of the questions of equit
from the judge by the jury.
II

AS A MATTER OF LAW RESPONDENTS'
COUHTERCLAIM WAS BARRED BY
THE CONTRACTS' EXPRESS PROVISIONS
AND BY RESPONDENTS' FAILURE TO
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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GIVE NOTICE OF REJECTION

-5-

A

Respondents contend that the contract was partially filled
in out of their presence.

It was disputed at trial whether the

terms of finance charge and percentage rate were in fact filled
in at the time of signing.

As.suming the jury determined this

issue in favor of respondents it is nevertheless clear that the.
parties had agreed on

thes~

terms of the contract and that if it

was not filled in at: signing it was later filled in in accordanc,
with the understanding of the parties.

&-t?.1l., ~1:5'2.., 1'1- ~>)

In any event the parties did review, sign and receive am
(/P...1'f)

of the Installment Sale and Security Agreement/Jand ccnformed th<
action to the terms thereof for about 8 months.("f~.Yo)
In its releveant parts the Agreement provides:
"This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement
of the parties and may not be altered or amended
except by written agreement of the parties."
In addition, under Seller's Warranties in bold face type the Agr'
ment provides:
"Seller makes ..• no warranties express or implied
respecting the property sold except title, and
expressly excludes any implied warranties of
merchantability or fitness."
The parties also signed as part cf the agreement to purchase th'
home the Mobile Home Purchase Agreement and Down Payment Receif'.
On this document in handwritten additions the appellants clearl_
wrote "as is" on each item regarding the mobile home, its exter:
and interior and its contents.
This reflects the facts which the appellants admitted at

'1

{'171·113,1t:
frR.1~, ,7)
1
certain
defects
;(lthat
~
that they inspected the home~and noted
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Cn.11~1r)
were aware of the prior use of the mobile home;~and that they
were aware of their obtaining a discounted price because of the
{TR.. l-1.13)

prior use and needed repairs.A Additional repairs were requested
and admitted at trial to have been made by the appellants.(rn.11l')
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code (U.U.C.C.) is applicable to
this matter since it involves the sale of goods.

Section 70A-2-316

U.U .C.C. subsections (2} and (J} provide:
(2) Subject: t:o subsection (3) > to exclude or
modify the implied warranty of merchantability
or any part: of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing, must
be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a
writing and conspicuous .••

( 3) Notwithstanding subsection ( 2) (a) unless
the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied
warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is", •••
Thus the acts of the appellants fully complied with the statutory provisions for exclusion of warranty.

In light of the particu-

lar nature of the sale of a priorly used item after full inspection,
it was error for the court to allow the jury to decide respondents
counterclaim since the verdict was contrary to the privisions of the
Utah Commercial Code providing for the protection of seller's of
merchandise.
In Tibbits v. Openshaw 18 Utah Zd 442, 425 P2d (1967), this
Court enforced the "as is" language with regard to a sale of land.
The legislative mandate is much clearer in this case, and the parties
exclusion of warranties is as extensive and clear.

B.
Secondly, the respondent failed to give reasonable notice of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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rejection or otherwise inform the appellants of any reason for
dissatisfaction as required by Utah Commercial Code, Section 70;
2-606(1) U.C.A. states:

Acceptance of the goods occurs when the buyer (a)
after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the
goods signifies to the seller that the goods are
conforming or that he will accept them in spite
of their non conformity, or (b) fails to make
effective rejection ••• but such acceptance does
not occur until the buyer has had a reasonable
opportunity to inspect them; •••
Section 70A-Z-607{J) sets forth t:he effect of an acceptanc:
Where tender ha& been accepted (a) the buyer must
within a reasonable time after he discovers or
should have discovered any breach notify the
seller of breach or be barred from any remedy;
In this case respondents each failed to make an effective :I
jection of the mobile home.

After inspecting the home and finci:J
(-n,.J ot.

1

) O(·~

some alleged defects the buyers accepted it nevertheless ·1' Appe.1
were under no obligation to take responsibility for any defects
since the terms of the two written agreements as well as the
understanding of the parties was that all warranties were waive.
However, appellants did undertake to make some repairs when re·
quested.

Respondents however continued to indicate that they

accepted the mobile home and failed to notify of any rejection.
Rather, they ceased making payments, moved out, and refused to
respond to respondents' demands for payment or explanation for'
lack of any.

Not until almost two years later and 6 months af:

appellants had commenced suit did the respondents set forth the
alleged defects and counterclaim of rejection.

This is not nc:

within a reasonable time and therefore respondents should ~~
barred as a matter of law from any remedy.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

This case is controlled on this point by the almost identical
case of Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Burns, 527 p 2d 655 (Utah, 1974)
where this Court held that the failure to object for two years
where there were express waivers of warranty precluded the buyer of
a mobile home from raising the defense of latent defects as a

defense to sellers suit for payment.
v. Masterson, 121, Utah

252~

See also, Knudsen Music Co.

240 P 2d 973 (1952).

CONCLUSION
As a matter of law the respondents failed to prove the elements
of fraud.

By so doing they can not properly invoke the personal

liability of the appellants for their acts as agents of the seller
corporation.

In addition, the seller corporation properly and

clearly excluded all warranties of merchantability and fitness in
two separate documents and through the parties understanding.
Respondents failed to give notice of their rejection of the mobile
home and were thereby barred from raLsing the alleged defects as
a defense to appellants suit for payment.

Respectfully submitted this

.?6~ day

of

~

, 1978.

I

~J. _

CXtfj(g

/Yr;.0_

r7

STEVEN F. ALDER

f

c-

(

!bU:Za

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Appellants Brief was mailed to Respondents' attorney, Mark S. Miner,
at 525 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Uc.-a-4111,

., fV(rr . 1978.
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~ l-r~

S'N!,.l.ilEN F. ALDER
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